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The Medicare prescription drug program started in January 2006, and constitutes 
the largest expansion of Medicare benefits since 1965.  There is an immediate need to 
understand the functioning of this program to better inform policy as changes are already 
under consideration.  A much debated potential reform is the reduction in the number of 
plans. This is in response to the massive entry of Part D plans, which has been argued to 
create large search costs when the elderly make their drug insurance decisions. A series 
of studies (Rice et al. (2008); Cubanski (2008); Kaiser Family Foundation 2006a), 
advocate for a reduction of Part D plans. These findings indicate that there may be 
political pressure to limit the number of choices. 
In light of the challenges the U.S. government faces in regulating this market 
effectively, this paper studies the welfare impact of two easily implementable, and 
fundamentally different, approaches toward limiting the number of Part D plans: reducing 
the maximum number of plans each firm can offer per region and removing plans that 
offer doughnut hole coverage. Both approaches would result in a reduction in plans of a 
similar magnitude (approximately 20%).  However, the latter involves eliminating a 
dimension of plans’ characteristics, the net consequences of which depend on consumers’ 
valuation of that dimension versus firms’ ability to soften competition by differentiating 
along it.   
To accomplish this task, we first provide evidence on the relative utility (or 
disutility) that the elderly derive from plan design features such as premium, deductible, 
gap coverage, etc. By measuring how seniors value these plan characteristics, we can 
assess whether they view Part D plans as differentiated products. Then, using our 
demand- and supply-side estimates, we assess the effects on equilibrium premia and 
welfare from limiting each firm to its two most popular plans per region (as opposed to 
the current three) and from removing plans that offer doughnut hole coverage.  Although 
we do not model search costs explicitly (in that a likely benefit of reducing the number of 
plans is a reduction in search costs from considering fewer options), our analysis can 
inform us about the magnitude of the flipside – how large these search costs should be in 
order to justify the welfare costs of limiting the number of plans offered in a market.  
These costs may result from the elimination of plans that consumers value and/or from   3
higher premia due to reduced competition.  Importantly, our analysis allows us to 
determine whether one approach is clearly superior to the other.  Finally, for validation 
purposes, we also use our estimates to assess the impact of a recent major merger 
between two Part D insurers.  
Our empirical strategy utilizes discrete choice methods pioneered by Berry (1994) 
to recover structural estimates of parameters of the demand and cost functions for the 
differentiated prescription drug plans (PDP). This method is especially appealing since it 
requires only aggregate data at the plan level, which is publicly available (e.g., plan 
market shares and characteristics)
1. The estimates from this procedure allow us to 
measure the value of plan characteristics to consumers, price elasticities of demand for 
each plan, and the consumer surplus created by the market. We combine our demand 
system with a Nash-Bertrand assumption to generate equilibrium premia and quantities
2, 
where firms take into account the expected subsidy they receive from the government. 
We then back out firms’ marginal costs and ultimately producer surplus. The structural 
nature of the estimates allows us to conduct counterfactual policy experiments to see how 
prices and welfare would change if we made changes in program design.  
Using this approach, we have several key findings. When plans covering in the 
doughnut hole are removed, the average premia for other “enhanced” plans
3 rise by 2 
percent while average premia for non-enhanced plans rise by only 0.1 percent. We find 
that consumer surplus and producer surplus fall by about 4 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively. In addition, the number of seniors enrolled in any PDP drops by 2.7 percent. 
In this case, we find that most of the welfare loss comes from seniors substituting for a 
less valuable option or dropping coverage. The premium effect concentrates mostly 
within the set of closest substitutes, i.e. the remaining enhanced plans.  
                                                 
1 Due to Part D’s recent implementation, no individual-level data is available in the public domain linking 
individuals to their plan choices.  
2 The actual mechanism is a bidding process that we cannot implement due to lack of data on key 
components such as reinsurance payments and the size of enhancements for enhanced plans. We postulate 
that firms submit their bids having in mind the premium the beneficiary will pay as a result of the bidding 
process, because consumers will make their enrollment decisions based on this premium and the 
characteristics of the plan. Therefore, a Bertrand game with differentiated products would capture the 
relevant features of the game.  
3 Enhanced plans are plans that are actuarially more generous than the standard plan design for Part D, and 
for which the government does not subsidize the extra premium associated with the enhancement. One kind 
of enhancement is to provide doughnut hole coverage.    4
On the other hand, when firms are limited to two plans in each region (as opposed 
to three)
4, we find more extreme results. In this case, the average premium rises by about 
7 percent and enrollment in PDP plans drops by about 14 percent. Consumer surplus falls 
by 25 percent and producer surplus falls by 14 percent. In this case, most of the welfare 
loss happens via premium increases. It is important to note that we find these results to be 
qualitatively robust for several alternative model specifications.   
The above two counterfactuals illustrate the potential costs from limiting plan 
offerings. These expected costs must be weighed against expected gains from reduced 
search costs when deciding to place stricter limitations on the number of plans that can be 
offered. For example, our results from limiting firms to offering two plans per region 
suggest that the reduction in annual search costs from this regulation must outweigh a 
loss of $24.40 per capita in consumer surplus – approximately two-thirds of the average 
monthly premium. In contrast, our results from eliminating plans that cover the gap imply 
that the necessary reduction in search costs is only $3.70 per capita. 
The strong contrast in our measurements for these two counterfactuals highlights 
how differing methods for reducing the number of plans can have substantially different 
effects on equilibrium prices and welfare. Eliminating plans covering the gap and 
restricting firms to two plans per region reduces the number of plans by similar amounts 
– 18 percent and 21 percent, respectively. However, the former approach eliminates a key 
mode of product differentiation, leaving the remaining plans, which are relatively similar 
in features, to compete primarily on price.  In contrast, restricting firms to two plans per 
region still allows for all forms of product differentiation, which better enables firms to 
soften price competition. Our results suggest then that a mandated reduction in the 
number of plans will likely have the least welfare losses if it is coupled with a restriction 
on plan features (ultimately restricting product differentiation). 
Finally, we validate our model by assessing the impact of a recent merger 
between two large insurers in this market, United Health Care and Pacificare. In 2006, 
these insurers submitted plans on a separate entity basis. In 2007, they submitted plans as 
a joint entity. Our model predicts that the increase in market power due to this merger 
would result in a 4.1 percent increase in average premia for the merged firms and a 0.7 
                                                 
4 We assume the firms drop the plan with the lowest enrollment in 2006.   5
percent increase in premia for other firms. In addition, consumer surplus would decline 
by 2.8 percent while producer surplus would increase by 1.7 percent. Furthermore, we 
compared our prediction about the increase in premium using post-merger data for year 
2007, and found that our model performed extremely well. These results not only 
illustrate the effects of a merger of this magnitude on this market, but also demonstrate 
our model’s ability to produce sensible counterfactual results, consistent with economic 
theory, and that perform well out-of-sample.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
description of the Medicare Part D market and Section 3 provides a literature review.  
Section 4 details our empirical methods, and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
presents our results, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Description of the market 
Medicare Part D was signed into law as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 and went into effect in January 
2006. Unlike the Hospital Insurance (Part A) and the Supplemental Medical Insurance 
(Part B), the delivery of the new benefit has been completely entrusted to the private 
sector. Private companies can provide the new benefit as either stand-alone plans, called 
Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs), or they can offer it together with Parts A and B as 
Medicare Advantage plans (MA-PDs).
5  Our study focuses just on the PDP market since 
prescription drug coverage cannot be priced separately in the MA-PD market. Medicare 
beneficiaries can enroll in these plans by paying a 74.5 percent-subsidized premium. 
Further price reductions happen according to income and dual Medicaid status. The first 
open enrollment took place from November 15
th 2005 to May 15
th 2006, during which 
time the elderly could make decisions about participating in this market. PDP plans 
enrolled 16.5 million of the 22.5 million Part D enrollees in 2006.  In subsequent years, 
open enrollment takes place from November 15
th-December 31
st of the previous year. In 
2006, a total of 1,429 different insurance plans owned by approximately 70 different 
                                                 
5 Before the enactment of MMA, private plans could also provide the benefits of Parts A and B of Medicare 
as Part C, later named Medicare+Choice.  However, the benefits of Parts A and B have been delivered 
mainly through the traditional fee-for-service Medicare, with private plans accounting for 15 percent of the 
total Medicare enrollees in 2000 and 12 percent in 2005. (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005)   6
companies were available in 34 regions into which the country is divided.
6  In 2007 even 
more plans entered, with a new total of 1,875 plans across all regions, increasing the 
relevance of the debate about limiting the number of plans. For 2009, 1,689 will be 
available. Dual eligible beneficiaries (those eligible for Medicaid as well as Medicare) 
were automatically enrolled in certain low cost plans, but allowed to switch to other plans. 
Although MMA specifies a standard drug benefit, the law allows deviations from that 
design as long as the modified plans are actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit.
7 
Most beneficiaries are locked in to their current plan for a full year, but are allowed to 
switch plans each open enrollment period at a premium that is community rated. The 
exception is for Medicaid-Medicare dual eligible enrollees who are allowed to switch 
plans at any point in the year, and who may have to pay a small premium to the extent 
that they switch into certain higher priced plans. 
 The standard drug benefit design specified in MMA for year 2006 comprises a 
deductible of $250 and three coverage zones where the fraction of the additional drug 
dollar covered by the insurer varies substantially. Figure 1 shows how out-of-pocket drug 
expenses vary with total drug spending in the different coverage zones of the plan. After 
the deductible is exhausted, the elderly are covered 75 percent for the next $2,000 spent 
in total prescription drug expenditure (initial coverage zone, ICZ), 0 percent between 
$2,250 and $5,100 (so the next $2,850) of total drug expenditure, the doughnut hole zone, 
and 95 percent after the $5,100 threshold (catastrophic coverage zone). Thus, at the point 
that catastrophic coverage begins, the beneficiary has spent $3,600 out of pocket ($250 in 
zone 1, $500 in zone 2, and $2,850 in region 3).  
The plans offered are differentiated along several dimensions, such as premium, 
deductibles, gap coverage, number of drugs in the formulary, copay sizes, etc. Insurance 
companies can deviate in plan design from the standard benefit described above and offer 
                                                 
6 The regions are composed of one or mores states, and were set by the government at the beginning of year 
2005. The regions were established to meet the MMA requirement of having no fewer than 10 and no more 
than 50 regions in all, and to maximize the availability of plans to eligible individuals regardless of health 
status, with particular attention to rural areas. Most (25) PDP regions consist of one state, six consist of two 
states pooled together, one consists of three states, and one consists of seven states.  
7 To the extent that the plan is more generous in actuarial terms than the standard benefit, the additional 
premium associated with the extra coverage is not subsidized by CMS.   7
a variety of plans as long as they satisfy certain requirements.
8   For example, an insurer 
can offer plans with lower or no deductibles and higher coinsurance rates for the initial 
coverage zone, or offer plans with tiered cost sharing in the initial coverage level as long 
as the tiered structure is equivalent to the standard 25 percent coinsurance rate.
9 Private 
insurers have taken advantage of the ability to offer modified plans and only nine percent 
of the 2006 plans (containing 22 percent of PDP enrollees in 2006) followed the standard 
benefit design. The actuarially equivalent design (same deductible, different cost sharing) 
was adopted by 21 percent of plans containing 17.1 percent of enrollees, while the basic 
alternative design (smaller deductible with different cost sharing) was selected by 27 
percent of plans containing 44.2 percent of PDP enrollees. In addition to benefit designs 
that are identical or actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit, insurance companies 
can also offer enhanced plans, i.e., coverage that is more generous than the standard 
benefit (this can be gap coverage, or lower deductible and lower cost sharing, or addition 
of non-Medicare covered drugs
10). Gap coverage (coverage of generic and/or branded 
drugs in the doughnut hole) was the enhancement that received the most attention 
because of the unpopularity of the donuthole (gap) in the first place. Enhanced benefits 
have additional premia associated with more generous coverage that are not subsidized 
by CMS. These enhancements were included in 43 percent of plans, containing 16.7 
percent of PDP enrollees. Firms could design up to three benefit packages per region, as 
                                                 
8 These are a) they should provide the same catastrophic coverage as the standard benefit (same cost 
sharing rule of 5 percent and same threshold of $3,600 in true out of pocket expenses) b) the deductible 
should not be higher than the standard benefit’s deductible of $250 c) assure actuarial equivalency of i) the 
value of total coverage (e.g., if they remove the deductible, the cost sharing in the initial coverage zone 
should be set higher than 25 percent), ii) cannot increase the threshold at which the 3
rd coverage zone ends 
(the end of the donut hole) and iii) cannot change the threshold at which the 3
rd coverage zone starts (start 
of the donut hole). These details are contained in the 2003 MMA. Also see Duggan et al (2008) for a 
description of the Medicare Part D program 
9 For example, a company cannot offer a plan with initial coverage limit higher than $2,250 (in 2006) that 
has a higher co-insurance rate above the deductible since this would violate condition iii) in the footnote 
above.  
10 All plan formularies must include at least two drugs in each therapeutic category (see CMS 2007 for 
details of categories), and must include substantially all drugs in six key therapeutic classes.  CMS 2008 
provides further details of what drugs must be covered. Plans are also forbidden to design formularies that 
discriminate against those with costly medical conditions (Hoadley 2005b); there is no evidence of heavy 
auditing of these requirements, but the threat remains.   8
long as one of them was standard or actuarially equivalent to a standard plan (Hoadley et 
al, 2006).
11 
To participate in the Part D PDP market, the insurance companies submit bids 
(separate bids for each region, even if they design just one plan to be offered nationally) 
stating their expected cost per beneficiary of providing the basic drug coverage. The 
expected cost is calculated with the understanding that CMS (and not the individual 
insurer) is responsible for 80 percent of drug costs that are incurred in the catastrophic 
zone.
12 This is required by MMA 2003, and is referred to as the reinsurance feature of 
Part D which lessens fears of adverse selection among private insurers.
13 CMS also asks 
plans to separately inform them of the cost of covering an individual if CMS were to not 
provide this reinsurance, in order to asses the total amount by which CMS subsidizes the 
coverage. This reporting is also required by MMA to make sure that CMS’s total subsidy 
to Part D (which includes the subsidy through reinsurance and the ‘direct subsidy’ paid 
prospectively to the insurer) on average comes to 74.5 percent of the total cost of 
providing coverage. 
  
3. Previous literature  
  Many recent papers have studied several aspects of Medicare Part D in order to 
guide future policy. Lakdawalla and Sood (2007) propose and calibrate a dynamic model 
to study the welfare effects of Medicare Part D, focusing on pharmaceutical innovation. 
They find that public drug insurance can be welfare enhancing by lowering the static 
welfare loss coming from the monopoly power granted by patent protection, and by 
encouraging innovation from pharmaceutical firms. Their study provides insights on a 
separate important policy issue, which is whether the government should be allowed to 
participate in price negotiations. They find that price negotiation by the government 
                                                 
11 However, the costs of the extra benefit will not be subsidized by the government, and therefore, the 
beneficiaries will have to pay an additional premium at the market rate. Enhanced plans must submit 
separate bids, in which it is made clear what portion of the plan is standard and what part is additional.  On 
average, the monthly premium for enhanced benefits is $10 higher than the premium for basic coverage 
(standard or modified).  An example of enhanced benefits would be provision of coverage within the 
doughnut hole. It is also important to note that such coverage is considered additional to the standard Part D 
benefit and will not count towards reaching the catastrophic coverage threshold. 
12 This means that only 15 percent of the catastrophic cost will be paid by the insurance company as the 
remaining 5 percent is the beneficiary’s liability by the plan design. 
13 MMA also calls for ‘risk corridors’to further reduce adverse selection fears and incentives to cream skim.   9
could slightly distort the monopoly price and decrease the deadweight loss from optimal 
monopoly pricing, and this would not have a negative effect on innovation as long as 
patent lengths are increased.  Their result is consistent with the traditional “long and 
narrow” dynamic optimal patent.  Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2006) surveyed seniors 
through WebTV devices to study consumers’ perceptions and choices of Medicare Part D 
plans during the open enrollment period. They found that most seniors chose the optimal 
action of enrolling. This result was expected since, according to their calculations, 
enrolling in Medicare Part D was immediately beneficial for 81.7 percent of the 
population, and inter-temporally beneficial for 97.5 percent.  With respect to their choice 
of plan, they found that consumers often chose cheaper plans when more expensive and 
comprehensive coverage was actuarially favorable.  
Kling et al (2008) conduct an experiment in which they recruit a sample of seniors 
from Wisconsin, find out their current list of medications taken, provide half with 
customized information and compare their plan choices to the other half which serve as a 
control group. They find that customized information (data on the prices of drugs under 
different plans and a recommendation of the cheapest plans for them, based on their 
current medications) leads the treatment group to select a plan that is cheaper for them in 
predicted terms than the control group (by $104 a year). Whether we should expect this to 
be zero optimally depends on whether consumers value non-price features like insurer 
reputation, as well as whether customers should choose an insurance plan only based on 
current information. Domino et al (2008) point out that about ½ of all seniors are likely to 
have medication experiences over the next 12 months that would have, in retrospect, 
made another plan appear cheaper than the one that is the cheapest based on current 
medications.  
  Other papers that report results of surveys that include seniors post Part D are 
Neuman et al (2007) and Levy and Weir (2008), both confirming the overall percent of 
seniors who are uninsured for prescription drugs fell to around 10 percent in 2006. 
Using discrete choice methods similar to those used here, Keating (2007) studies 
the switching behavior of the elderly and the pricing behavior of insurers during the first 
couple years of Part D. He finds that there are substantial switching costs for consumers,   10
which on average exceed the premia paid by beneficiaries. In contrast, our paper aims at 
bounding the search costs.  
Closest in spirit to our work is Town and Liu (2003), who estimate the welfare 
impact of Medicare HMOs during the 1993 to 2000 period. They found big increases in 
consumer surplus due to the introduction of Medicare HMOs, and a sizable portion of 
that surplus in the last year of their study (45 percent) comes from making available 
prescription drugs to the elderly through these plans. They study the effect of 
counterfactuals such as what would happen to welfare if more plans were added to the 
markets, and find increases in consumer surplus, stemming mostly from increased price 
competition. In Medicare HMO markets, whose geographic unit is a county, the number 
of options available to consumers was quite limited, with the most frequent market 
structure being monopoly. This paper provided early evidence that broad prescription 
drug coverage for the elderly could be achieved through private managed care plans, and 
that competition in Medicare HMO markets increased consumer welfare. Our work 
complements theirs by showing that competition enhances consumer surplus under a very 
different market structure, one with many more competitors. In addition, we show that 
product differentiation could play an important role when considering mechanisms for 
limiting choices.  We also find that the distribution of welfare is more evenly distributed 
between consumers and producers under Medicare Part D than under Medicare HMO.  
A primary motivation for our work comes from studies that document the 
prevailing desire among seniors and other interested parties to see reduced choice in the 
Part D market. A Kaiser Family Foundation-Harvard School of Public Health poll 
conducted during the open enrollment period 2006
14 finds that seniors favor 
simplification,
15 removing the donuthole,
16 and reducing the number of plans available.
17 
Only 11 percent strongly favored keeping the program as is. Rice et al (2008) proposes 
that CMS “acts as a broker to winnow down the number of choices so that beneficiaries 
face a small subset of those judged to be best on several dimensions,” specifically 
limiting the number of choices that consumers would face to 10 per region, with 8 being 
                                                 
14 Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006b.  
15 51 percent of seniors ‘strongly agree’ that the design of part D is ‘too complicated’. 
16 46 percent ‘strongly favor’ spending more government money to remove the coverage gap. 
17 44 percent of seniors ‘strongly favor’ reducing the number of plans.   11
national plans and 2 being regional or state-only plans. CMS would select these plans 
from bids submitted by insurers (up to 3 bids each), so that the 10 choices selected would 
provide lower-cost, lower-coverage options as well as higher-cost, higher-coverage 
options. The study then goes on to describe the logistics of three cases where the 
government has acted as an agent for consumers in selecting the options they face: 
pension plans for state employees (New York and Ohio), Arizona’s Medicaid program, 
and California’s Medicaid hospital contracting.  
Lab surveys also find seniors expressing preference for reduced choice. Reed, 
Mikels and Simon (2008) find that seniors report desiring fewer choices across several 
domains than younger adults, and that the gap is larger for health care domains (including 
drug plans). Mikels, Reed and Simon (2008) find that seniors report lower willingness to 
pay for increasing the number of choices available for drug coverage plans than younger 
adults. Both findings are consistent with older adults experiencing decreased decision-
making capacity and high search costs. Cubanski (2008) reports that 49 percent of seniors 
enrolled in Part D say in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2006 that there are 
‘too many’ drug plans to choose from.  There are benefits from reduced cognitive loads 
/reduced search costs when seniors have fewer choices from which to choose their drug 
coverage. Our paper’s counterfactual exercises quantify how high these benefits must be 
to overcome the costs of reduced choices in the form of consumer welfare lost from 
reduced competition and reduced options.  
 
4. Empirical method 
 
  For our empirical analysis, we estimate the structural parameters of the demand 
and supply sides of the market. The approach follows that of, e.g., Berry (1994), Berry et 
al. (1995), Bresnahan et al. (1997), Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002), and Town and Liu (2003).  
 
Demand Estimation 
For our demand-side analysis, we estimate demand(s) for differentiated PDPs 
using aggregate data following the seminal work of Berry (1994). The approach is as 
follows.  First, we write down an expression for the utility experienced by an individual   12
from purchasing a given Medicare Part D plan as a function of plan characteristics, 
premium, a set of parameters, and unobservables.  Next, given this utility function, we 
derive an analytical formula for the market share that should result for a given plan. 
Market shares represent the outcome of consumer decision-making in the aggregate. 
Then, using a clever transformation first described by Berry (1994), we solve for the 
parameters of the utility function. 
  Each individual is assumed to maximize her utility by choosing among the  1 t J +  
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t
ijt i jt jt ijt jJ uy p X α βξ ε
∈ =− ++ +  
  i = 1,…,I  j = 0,…, t J   t = 1,…,T 
 
where  i y  is the income of individual i,  jt p  is the premium of plan j in market t,  'jt X  is a 
vector of observable plan characteristics (e.g., deductible),  jt ξ  is an unobserved (by the 
econometrician) product characteristic, and  ijt ε  is a random, idiosyncratic utility shock 
for individual i for plan j in market t.  We assume that utility for the “outside option” (j = 
0) has the following form: 
 
(2)      0 () it i i j t uy α ε =+  
 
where  0t ξ  has been normalized to 0.  The outside option represents choosing not to enroll 
in any plan. 
We decompose utility into two parts – mean utility and an idiosyncratic shock.  




jtj t j t j t Xp δ βα ξ =+ +  
   13
and the idiosyncratic shock is simply ijt ε .  We ignore the income term since it is common 
to all plans and will eventually drop out of the analysis
18. 
  Within the above framework, once a distribution for the idiosyncratic error terms 
is chosen, we can then calculate the probability that an individual will choose a given 
plan.  At the aggregate level, these probabilities represent market shares for each plan.  
For example, if we assume the ijt ε ’s are distributed i.i.d., Type I Extreme Value, the 
above model simplifies to the aggregate logit model, where the probability of choosing a 



















  Next, we find the vector of mean utilities,  () s δ , that solves the system of 
equations: 
 
(5)  () ss δ =  
 
where s is the vector of observed market shares. 
  For the logit model, this system has a simple solution.  By taking logs of both 
sides, subtracting the log of the market share of the outside good, and solving, we get: 
 
(6)  0 ln( ) ln( ) ( ) jt t jt ss s δ −=  
 




0 ln( ) ln( ) jt t jt jt jt ss Xp β αξ −= − +  
 
                                                 
18 Implicitly, we are assuming no income effects since income enters utility linearly.   14
Written this way, we can use a 2SLS estimator using proper instruments to get estimates 
for α and β.  If we assumed  jt X  and  jt p  are uncorrelated with  jt ξ , we will get proper 
estimates by simply performing OLS, however, it is likely that  jt p  is correlated with the 
unobserved characteristic, and therefore, we follow and instrumental variable approach. 
  A common criticism of the logit assumption is that it imposes strong restrictions 
on substitution patterns across products.  For example, it forces cross-price elasticities to 
be functions only of price and market share, not observable characteristics.  With regard 
to Medicare plans, we might think that, say, plans with similar drug coverage are closer 
competitors than those with significantly different drug coverage.  For this reason, we 
follow a nested logit approach.  This approach is identical to the one described above 
except it allows for correlations in the idiosyncratic error terms.  It separates the plans 
into subgroups (or nests), and allows the error terms for plans sharing a nest to be 
correlated.  For example, we may separate plans into those that are enhanced (i.e., are 
more than actuarially equivalent to the basic plan design) and not enhanced.  This nest 
structure allows for the likely possibility that plans with similar drug coverage are more 
substitutable than plans with notably different drug coverage.   
   We incorporate the nest structure in Figure 2, which places enhanced and non-
enhanced plans in separate nests, and allow for correlated error terms within these nests. 
To do this, we augment our formulation for utility (from equation (1)) to get: 
 
 (8) 
' (1 ) () jt ig ijt i jt jt ijt uy p X σ α βξ ζ ε +− =− ++ +  
 
Here,  ig ζ  is common to all plans in group g and has a distribution that depends on σ 
(01 σ ≤≤ ).  As σ approaches one, the within group correlation of utility goes to one, and 
as it approaches zero, the utility of plans in the same group becomes uncorrelated.  The 
distribution of  ig ζ  is such that  (1 ) ig ijt ζ σε + −  is Type I Extreme Value. 
Given this utility formulation, we follow the same procedure as described above 
for the logit and arrive at the following analog to equation (7)
19: 
 
                                                 
19 Full details of the intermediate steps are in Berry (1994), page 253.   15
(9) 
'
/ 0 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) jg jt t jt jt jt ss Xp s β ασ ξ −= − + +  
 
Note that equation (9) is identical to equation (7) except for the additional term  / ln( ) j g s , 
which is the log of the market share of plan j within group g.   
Using the nested logit approach, we can again use 2SLS to get estimates for α and 
β.  OLS is no longer an option because, even if we assumed  jt X  and  jt p  are uncorrelated 
with  jt ξ ,  / ln( ) j g s  is correlated with  jt ξ  by construction.  We build our set of instruments 
following Bresnahan et al. (1997).  These variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with 
unobserved plan characteristics but correlated with within group share.  In particular, we 
use the following as instruments: 
  observed product characteristics ( j X ) for each product j, 
  counts and means of X for products sharing a cluster with product j, 
  counts and means of X for products sold by the firm offering product j, and 
  counts and means of X for products sharing both cluster and seller. 
 
Supply and Marginal Costs 
  On the supply side, we assume firms partake in Bertrand-Nash competition.  
Specifically, each firm maximizes its profit: 
 
(10) ( ) ( )
t ft jt jt jJ jt
Mp m c s δ
∈ Π= − ∑
 
 
where M is market size and  jt mc  is marginal cost for product j in market t. This leads to 
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  We can invert the system of first-order conditions to solve for marginal costs as 
follows:   16
 
(12) 
1 (, ;) () mc p p X s θ δ
− =− Δ  
 
where mc, p, and s are vectors of marginal costs, premia, and market shares, and 
(, ;) pXθ Δ  is the appropriately defined matrix of own- and cross- price share derivatives 
(Petrin, 2002).  Once we have estimates for the demand-side parameters, we can directly 
solve for marginal costs using equation (12). 
Using the estimated parameters of the utility function, we can calculate own- and 
cross-price elasticities for each product.  Further, combining these demand-side estimates 
with our marginal cost estimates, we can calculate welfare measures and conduct 
counterfactuals for the choice sets.  We describe these procedures, their outcomes, and 




This paper uses data on enrollment and plan characteristics of stand-alone Part D 
plans offered during 2006. Using the first year of data for this analysis has two particular 
advantages.  First, firms had less knowledge of regional demands for this product, 
reducing the likelihood that product characteristics are correlated with unobserved 
components of demand (i.e., this makes it less likely the product characteristics in our 
model are endogenous).  Second, as this is the first time consumers bought this product, 
there are no switching costs.  For subsequent years, these could be relevant (Keating 
2007) and would be difficult to fully capture using aggregate data. 
The CMS Landscape file contains basic characteristics of each plan (premium, 
deductible, coverage during the gap, number of top 100 drugs that are on the plan’s 
formulary or not, etc.).
 20 Enrollment data come from the CMS enrollment file for 2006, 
released July 2006. This file shows the number of people enrolled in each of 1415 plans 
on which we have data on all items needed (with enrollment numbers under 10 
suppressed by CMS).  Certain plans are designated Low Income Subsidy (LIS) eligible, 
and were automatically assigned enrollees in the region who were previously qualifying 
                                                 
20 This is available for download from [http://www.medicare.gov/medicarereform/map.asp] (access date 
May 2006).    17
for full Medicaid coverage, as Medicare beneficiaries for drug coverage. However, these 
plans are also the lowest cost options in the region by definition, and thus enjoyed high 
enrollment from voluntary enrollees, too. Automatically enrolled individuals were free to 
change plans (paying the difference in premia when moving to plans that are not LIS 
eligible), and they are able to do so at any time, unlike others who are locked in by the 
annual enrollment period. CMS has not released any information that allows researchers 
to tell what portion of a plan’s enrollment is due to Medicaid duals as opposed to others; 
however, even if it were known, our outcome of interest would anyway be the total 
enrollment given that everyone has flexibility of choosing their own plan, with LIS 
eligible individuals receiving a fixed amount of money to apply toward premium 
payments.  
  Our data set consists of one observation for each of 1,429 plans (of which 
enrollment data are available for 1415 plans as the others enrolled fewer than 10) that 
were offered in the PDP market in 2006.  Of these, we observe all the relevant variables 




6.1.  Economic Measures 
 
In Table 3, we present the results for two models: the nested logit with no IVs and 
the nested logit with IVs (both with region and firm fixed effects).  The IV results suggest 
instrumenting is important in this case, as the OLS results appear to have a positive bias 
on premium (as theory would predict).  Using the IV estimates, we see that characteristics 
that should add value such as gap coverage, branded drugs coverage in the gap and the 
number of top 100 drugs on the formulary show results consistent with them adding value.  
Higher deductibles and premia reduce value as expected. These are all attributes that are 
easily observable, and important in choosing an insurance plan. Prior authorization 
(Auth_100) and co-pays under $20 (Under 20_100) have counterintuitive signs, possibly  
raising the question of how aware seniors were of these (perhaps more obscure) attributes 
when they made their decisions as suggested by Kling et al (2008). The analysis that   18
follows utilizes our IV estimates, and we discuss the robustness of our findings and the 
results from alternative model specifications in Section 6.3. 
We begin our analysis by quantifying the value of the plan attributes to consumers, 
which is an important exercise given that the design of the plans is heavily influenced by 
policy. We find that consumers value a $250 decrease in the annual deductible by 
approximately $46 per year (250*(0.002/0.130)*12).
21 An extra top 100 drug added to 
the formulary is worth approximately $11, and gap coverage of generics is valued at 
about $3 on average. The coverage of branded drugs appears to be what seniors value the 
most with an estimated annual value of $443. 
Using the estimates from our baseline model, we can calculate own- and cross- 
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where: g is the group (enhanced or not enhanced). 
 
The first formula is the own price elasticity; the second is the cross-price elasticity 
for plans j and k that do not belong to the same nest g; and the third is the cross-price 
elasticity for products that belong to the same nest.  Given the large number of plans, we 
can only present a sample of our estimated elasticities. We are able to capture the 
intuitive result that enhanced plans are closer substitutes to each other than to non-
enhanced plans. Table 4 shows a sample of our estimated elasticities for the players with 
the largest market shares.
22 The elasticities in the table show that enhanced plans, denoted 
by (1), are closer substitutes to each other than non-enhanced plans, and vice versa. It is 
                                                 
21 The coefficient on premium is the estimate for a household’s marginal utility from money.  Therefore, to 
determine the monetary value of a given characteristic, we must divide its coefficient by the coefficient on 
premium.  Also, our data are monthly, requiring us to multiply by 12 to get annual estimates. 
22 The table containing all the plans is available upon request.   19
also interesting to note that the two largest players (Humana and United) chose to have 
their plans in different nests. These elasticities are calculated from estimated parameters, 
and therefore, they also have standard errors. To get the standard errors, we repeatedly 
sampled from the asymptotic distribution of parameters and recalculated elasticities for 
each set of parameters. This exercise shows that our calculated elasticities are fairly 
accurate.
23   
Our estimates also allow us to calculate important welfare measures of this market.  
In particular, we can calculate producer and consumer surplus for the current market 
environment, and then recalculate and compare these measures in our counterfactuals.  
The formulas for these measures are as follows: 
 
(16)  () * * jtt j tt j t tj PS p subs mc Size s =+ − ∑∑  
(17)  CS = ) 1 ln( ) ˆ 1 (
ˆ
12
1 0 + + − D D σ
α  
 
where D0 and D1 are the sum of the exponential of the estimated utility generated by non-
enhanced and enhanced plans, respectively.   
Here,  t Size  is the number of potential customers in market t and  t subs  is the 
subsidy provided in market t
24.  The first column of Table 5 contains our estimates for 
these measures for the PDP market as it was in 2006. Using (16), we find producer 
surplus was $952 million. Then, using (17), we find that consumer surplus was $1.15 
billion. It is interesting to see that the distribution of surplus between consumers and 
producers is fairly even, and very different from what it used to be under the Medicare 
HMO market structure, as documented by Town and Liu (2003).  We follow the same 
approach as we did with the elasticities to calculate the standard errors shown in the first 
column of Table 4. 
 
                                                 
23 These results are also available upon request. 
24 We calculate the subsidy as (74.5/25.5) times the mean of the premiums (post subsidy) for the non-
enhanced plans. This is because the enhancements are not subsidized by the government. Marketsize is 
defined as the sum of those who are enrolled in PDPs in the region plus those who remain uninsured for 
prescription drugs in the market.    20
6.2. Policy Experiments 
 
Having recovered the structural parameters, we perform two counterfactuals to 
inform future policy about the likely effects on classic measures of producer and 
consumer surplus from limiting the number of choices of PDP plans. We then provide a 
lower bound for the size of the search costs (that are argued to exist via survey-based 
research) necessary to justify implementing these limits.
25  
Before conducting our two counterfactuals concerning limitation of choice, we 
seek to validate our model by simulating the impact of the merger of two important 
participants in this market, United and Pacificare, whose effect occurred between the first 
year and second year outcomes. In this counterfactual, the bids in 2006 are treated as 
being submitted by two separate firms, and after 2006 they are treated as behaving as one 
firm.
26 We implement this counterfactual by perturbing the ownership matrix 
1 ) ; , (
− Δ θ X p  above as in Nevo (2000) and Town (2001). As shown in the third column of 
Table 5, our model predicts that the increase in market power due to this merger would 
result in a 4.1 percent increase in average premia for the merged firms and a 0.7 percent 
increase in premia for other firms. Consumer surplus would decline by 2.8 percent while 
producer surplus would increase by 1.7 percent.  
We then use post-merger data to provide some validation for our predictions 
about premium change (this is the only dimension for which actual data exists for 
validation). Because our model is static, it is not informative of the nominal premium the 
merging firms will charge post-merger, but it does provide information about their 
relative premium with respect to the average market premium. We observe from the 2007 
equivalent of our CMS landscape file that the actual 2007 premia show a 4.0 percent 
increase of this ratio, whereas our model predicts a 3.5 percent increase. These results not 
only illustrate the effects of a merger of this magnitude on this market, but also 
demonstrate our model’s ability to produce sensible counterfactual results, consistent 
with economic theory and out-of-sample predictions.  
                                                 
25 A direct calculation of search costs will be done in a follow-up paper, when individual-level data is 
available. 
26 The merger took place after the 2006 plans bids had been placed and the 2006 offerings decided by CMS. 
In announcing the merger, the CEO of Pacificare is quoted as saying: “This merger will enhance our 
resources, strengthen our product offerings…” (Press release from UnitedHealth, July 6
th 2005). The actual 
merger took place late 2005, before the 2007 plan bids were due (Cubanski and Neuman, 2006).   21
We now present the results for our two policy experiments focusing on the effects 
of removing plans from the market. The first of these policy experiments involves the 
removal of plans offering gap coverage
27. This policy would reduce the number of plans 
by 18 percent. We perform this experiment to assess the welfare losses that would have 
occurred, had the government not allowed gap plans to be offered, and also to find the 
consequences of a small intervention that not only limits the number of choices, but also 
decreases product differentiation. As shown in column 4 of Table 5, we find that 
consumer and producer surplus decrease by 3.9 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. We 
decompose the total effects by premium and product substitution (including the outside 
option). We find that, in this counterfactual, the premium response is fairly limited, and 
that most of the loss in both consumer and producer surplus comes from substitution to 
less preferred plans. This result is consistent with theory, given that we would expect 
limited premium responses when a reduction in competitors is coupled with the 
elimination of a dimension along which products can be differentiated (which would help 
soften price competition if it remained). At the bottom of the table, we show that the 
effect of this policy on equilibrium premia is very small in the aggregate (0.9 percent). 
However, it has a bigger impact on the premia of the remaining enhanced plans without 
gap coverage (2.0 percent), and practically no effect for the plans in the other nest (0.1 
percent). Enrollment is also moderately affected (-2.7 percent).  
The second of these policy experiments explores what would be the effect of a 
more universal limitation in the number of options. In particular, we consider the effect of 
restricting firms to a maximum of two plan offerings per region. When imposing this rule 
in our model, we assume firms keep the plans that had the largest enrollment. This 
experiment reduces the number of plans by 21 percent. As shown in column 5 of Table 5, 
we find that this counterfactual has a larger impact on both consumer and producer 
surplus.  We find that consumer surplus falls by approximately 25 percent and producer 
surplus falls by about 14 percent. Enrollment falls by 14 percent. Decomposing the 
                                                 
27 Both of these counterfactuals should be interpreted under the assumptions that firms do not change the 
design of their contracts when one of their own or competitors’ product is removed, and further exit or 
entry do not occur if a nest becomes more or less competitive.    22
effects, we find that most of the consumer welfare loss comes from premium increases, 
which on average increased by 7 percent (as shown at the bottom of the table).
28  
The two policies we consider result in similar-sized reductions in plans, but have 
drastically different effects on welfare and premia. By eliminating a dimension of product 
differentiation, the former forces the remaining plans to still compete heavily on price. In 
contrast, the latter policy still allows firms to offer plans that cover the gap, preserving a 
dimension of product differentiation that allows firms to significantly soften price 
competition. When we calculate the loss in surplus (per capita) for both policy 
experiments, the former results in only a reduction of $3.70, while the latter results in a 
loss of $24.40 (approximately 2/3
 of the average monthly premium). Along with the loss 
of participation, these losses must be weighed against the expected gain due to reduced 
search costs when evaluating policies that reduce choice. Our findings strongly suggest 
that policies designed to reduce the number of plans will have significantly lower welfare 
costs if they also restrict firms’ abilities to differentiate their products. 
 
6.3. Robustness of the Results 
  In this subsection, we discuss the robustness of our findings, particularly with 
regard to our counterfactual results on choice size – the main focus of our analysis. In 
particular, we address possible concerns about: 1) Our choice of nest structure and 2) The 
validity of instruments. To address concerns about nest structure, we consider a 
completely different, but also natural, nesting structure for Part D plans. Specifically, we 
consider a nesting structure based on the existence of a deductible instead of the existence 
of enhanced features (i.e., we have two nests, one consisting of plans with no deductible 
and one consisting of plans with positive deductibles). Using this nest structure, we re-
calculated the above estimates. While there are some quantitative differences, our results 
with respect to counterfactual removals of plans are qualitatively identical to our original 
model. While one could certainly envision other nesting structures, these findings 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that the new equilibrium premiums are calculated based on the structure recovered for 
our Bertrand game, which is an abstraction of the real bidding mechanism. For example, we hold the 
subsidy fixed at the level implied by the actual equilibrium prices, meaning we assume firms do not 
account for the effects of their own prices on the ultimate subsidy. This is a simplifying assumption, 
without which, the equilibrium prices would be higher as the perceived marginal benefits to raising price 
would be greater.   23
increase our confidence that our choice of nesting structure is not driving our primary 
conclusions. 
  The validity of our instruments may pose a concern since it could be argued that 
characteristics of Part D plans (that are used as instruments) are easier to adjust in the 
short-run than, say, automobile characteristics. We address this concern in several ways. 
First, we note that the change in our results when moving from OLS to IV estimation is 
extremely similar to that seen in other analyses where product characteristics are more 
obviously exogenous (e.g., automobiles). Second, we note that the striking accuracy of 
our out-of-sample validation in the merger analysis is consistent with a well-specified 
model. Third, since 2006 was the first year this market existed, it seems firms would have 
had relatively little demand information on which to condition their product offerings that 
year. Finally, taking advantage of the fact that most firms offer their plans in several 
regions, we implement our estimation using brand-specific dummy variables as in Nevo 
(2000).  The dummy variables will capture the utility of the characteristics that do not 
change by market,  j j X ξ β + , and therefore, there is no need to instrument for price since 
the unobserved product quality is controlled for with the dummy variable (however, we 
still need to instrument for the inside nest market share in our nested logit specification). 
We calculate the consumer and producer surplus for the baseline situation and each of our 
counterfactuals using this alternative approach, and our results are qualitative robust to 
this estimation method as well. Again, the above observations and analysis cannot 
eliminate all concerns about the validity of our instruments; however, we believe they do 
serve to increase confidence in the robustness of our findings. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper studies the impact of a proposed change in regulation of a government-
created market. We used discrete choice methods for aggregate data to estimate the 
demand for stand-alone PDP plans, where each plan is a bundle of attributes to which 
consumers attach value. We provided evidence of the relative value of various features of 
the plan’s design. Assuming a Bertrand game with differentiated products, we were able 
to identify marginal costs for each plan, and provide welfare calculations. Our primary 
analysis focused on two easily implementable, and fundamentally different, policy   24
experiments concerning reductions in the number of Part D plans, results of which may 
help guide future policy in the area of choice limitation. We find that regulating down the 
number of plans could have a large impact on consumer (and producer) surplus, 
depending on how the reduction of plans is made. We found that reducing choice will 
have a notably smaller welfare cost if it is coupled with a decrease (e.g., restriction) in 
product differentiation. 
   25
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The graph above shows how the insurance benefit translates prescription drug costs  to 
total out-of-pocket costs for a beneficiary. Source: Authors depiction of standard plan 
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Premium  Measured in dollars per month 
Deductible Measured  in  dollars per year (annual deductible) 
Form_100  Measures the number of drugs, of the top 100 drugs taken by 
seniors, that are on the plan’s formulary 
Auth_100  Measures the number of drugs, of the top 100 drugs for 
seniors, for which the plan requires prior authorization
*  
Under20_100 
Measures the number of drugs in the top 100 list that have 
copays of under $20 during the initial coverage zone of the 
plan 
Gapgen  Means that the plan covers generics in the donuthole portion 
of the plan 
Gapgenb  Means the plan covers generics and brand name drugs in the 
donuthole portion of the plan 
 
* Prior authorization is a utilization hurdle whereby the physician must call the plan for prior approval 
before prescribing that drug for the senior. The number of drugs with these requirements rising means less 
generous coverage. 




Variable Mean  Stdev  Min  Max 
Enrollment  9462.9       23560.58  10  327541 
Market  share  0.015 0.029 0.000 0.245 
Premium  38.46  12.25 4.91 73.17 
Deductible 74.4  108.8  0  250 
Form_100 93.21  6.78  75  100 
Auth_100 9.64  9.38  0  44 
Under20_100 61.37  13.18  20  95 
Gapgen .148  .36  0  1 
Gapgenb .025  .15  0  1 
                   Note: sample size is 1251 when limited to plans that report all the variables above.   31
Table 3
* 
Parameter estimates for Medicare Plan D demand models 
 
 OLS  t IV t 
Constant -5.127 -11.611  -11.075 -9.421 
Premium -0.029 -11.549 -0.130  -9.476 
Deductible 0.004  18.767  -0.002  -2.218 
Form_100  0.053 13.012 0.110  9.076 
Auth_100  0.010 2.859 0.062 6.133 
Under20_100  -0.013 -9.165 -0.008 -2.482 
Gapgen -0.294 -5.754 0.029  0.235 
Gapgenb  1.155 7.708 4.802 8.388 
Sigma     0.246  2.746 
                               * Dummies for firm and region fixed effects omitted. 30 
 
 
Table 4: Average price elasticities 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11  12  13 
1.  United  AARP  (0)  -3.685  0.107 0.330 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192 0.013 
2.  United  MedAdvance  (0)  0.892  -5.043 0.330 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192 0.013 
3.  Memberhealth  Basic  (0)  0.892  0.107  -4.940 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192 0.013 
4.  Memberhealth  Choice  (0)  0.892  0.107 0.330  -6.630 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192 0.013 
5.  Memberhealth  Gold  (1)  0.497  0.059 0.184 0.022  -7.273 0.536 0.332 0.071 0.016  0.017 0.051 0.107 0.007 
6.  Humana  Complete  (1)  0.434  0.049 0.161 0.022 0.068  -8.397 0.332 0.060 0.010  0.009 0.039 0.093 0.005 
7.  Humana  Enhanced  (1)  0.434  0.049 0.161 0.022 0.068 0.536  -2.181 0.060 0.010  0.009 0.039 0.093 0.005 
8.  Unicare  Rewards  (0)  0.892  0.107 0.330 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090  -3.956 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192 0.013 
9.  Unicare  Plus  (1)  0.483  0.058 0.179 0.022 0.079 0.518 0.321 0.070  -5.239  0.017 0.050 0.104 0.007 
10.  Unicare  Premium  (1)  0.483  0.058 0.179 0.022 0.079 0.518 0.321 0.070 0.016  -6.988 0.050 0.104 0.007 
11  Pacificare  Comprehensive  (1) 0.497  0.059 0.184 0.022 0.081 0.536 0.332 0.071 0.016  0.017  -7.683 0.107 0.007 
12.  Pacificare  Saver  (0)  0.892  0.107 0.330 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011  -4.462 0.013 
13.  Pacificare  Select  (0)  0.892  0.107 0.330 0.039 0.019 0.144 0.090 0.127 0.003  0.003 0.011 0.192  -6.949 
Note: (0) denotes non-enhanced plan, (1) denotes enhanced. Numbers at the top of the table correspond to the number in the first column, therefore the diagonal 
elements correspond to own price elasticities, the off-diagonal elements are the cross price elasticities between the row and column product.   31 
Table 5: Welfare and Policy Experiments 
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